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1. Introduction 
The relevance of time consistent policies stems from the fact that the government has 
no incentive to change its policy once private agents have made their decisions conditional 
on that announced policy. Unfortunately, the difficulty in solving the time consistent optimal 
policy problem that defines the Markov policy has generally led academic research into the 
characterization of the more limited Ramsey optimal policies, that assume commitment and 
are hence subject to potential deviations by the government from the previously announced 
policy rule. The same difficulty also explains that most research on time-consistent optimal 
policies has been done in exogenous growth environments.  
Ortigueira (2006) and Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008) consider the same stylized 
exogenous growth model, with leisure and public consumption in the utility function, to 
characterize the optimal time-consistent tax policy under two different game designs. Klein, 
Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008) consider a game in which the government is a dominant player 
that takes the optimal reaction of private agents as given when deciding the optimal policy. 
Ortigueira (2006) compares the results obtained under the structure in Klein, Krusell and 
Rios-Rull with those from an alternative design of the game in which the government and 
private agents make their respective decisions simultaneously, characterizing the behavior of 
the economy along the transition to the optimal steady-state. These authors consider 
alternative fiscal structures, always with a single instrument: either a single tax levied on 
total income, a single tax on capital income or a single tax on labor income. Martin (2010) 
follows the same game structure as Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008), extending the 
analysis to the simultaneous consideration of different tax rates for capital and labor income, 
solving for the optimal time consistent choice for both fiscal instruments. A further 
exogenous growth analysis is done by Azzimonti et al. (2009), who characterize the 
Markovian tax rate raised on total income when used to finance public investment. 
For the literature on optimal taxation, it is of central importance to overcome the two 
limitations mentioned above, by describing how to characterize the optimal time consistent 
fiscal policy under endogenous growth. Endogenous growth models not only allow for a 
more plausible representation of actual economies, but also for explicitly taking into account 
the effect of fiscal policy on the rate of growth. 
That is the type of analysis in Malley et al. (2002), who characterize the Markov tax 
policy in an endogenous growth economy where the government raises tax revenues on total 
income, using the proceeds to finance public consumption and government production 
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services. However, their setup is still too restrictive in two directions: i) the split of 
government spending between consumption and investment is exogenously given, and ii)  
private agents are supposed to have a logarithmic utility function and physical capital is 
supposed to fully depreciate each period. Under these parametric restrictions, the Ramsey 
policy is not subject to a time consistency problem and it coincides with the Markov perfect 
solution, a result that we show later on.1
In our paper we overcome these two additional limitations: First, we consider an 
economic environment with a CRRA utility function defined on private and public 
consumption, with incomplete depreciation of capital. Second, we incorporate an 
endogenously time-varying split of government spending between public consumption and 
public capital. For standard parameterizations of our model we show that a reasonable time 
consistent optimal policy exists and it is described by the optimal choice of both, the income 
tax and the split of public spending between consumption and production activities. Under 
the Markov solution the state of the economy, represented by the public to private capital 
ratio, is always on the Balanced Growth Path. Additionally, we numerically show that there 
is not indeterminacy of equilibrium and hence, the Markov solution lacks any transitional 
dynamics. 
  
Under this more general economic framework, when comparing the optimal Markov-
perfect and Ramsey policies, we find that: i) the income tax rate is higher under the time 
consistent policy, since the Markov government cannot internalize the distortionary effects 
of the current tax on the level of investment undertaken in previous periods (as in Ortigueira 
(2006), in a neoclassical growth framework), ii) the proportion of public resources devoted 
to consumption is higher under the Markov government than under the Ramsey government, 
since the former only commits to current policies, thereby giving priority to current 
consumption, with an immediate effect on utility, rather than to investment, whose effects on 
production and welfare will mainly take place in future periods, and iii) as a result, 
economic growth is slightly lower under the Markov-perfect policy than under the Ramsey 
policy, with the growth rate under lump-sum taxes being the highest. 
The implication is that a government that is aware that society knows its inability to 
pledge future policy decisions should impose a slightly higher tax rate and devote a higher 
share of public resources to consumption, with a relatively lower implied rate of growth. 
   
                                                          
1 Azzimonti et al. (2009) also show this result for an exogenous growth economy.  
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In section 2 we describe the model economy and analyze the competitive equilibrium 
conditions. The alternative optimal policy problems, with and without commitment on the 
part of the government, are presented in section 3. In section 4 we characterize the time-
consistent optimal policy in an economy with logarithmic preferences and full depreciation 
of private capital, which allow for an analytical solution to exist. In section 5 we analyze a 
more general economy with CRRA preferences and incomplete depreciation of private 
capital. For this more general economic environment, we numerically characterize the 
optimal fiscal policies obtained with and without commitment of the government in section 
6. The welfare loss under the time-consistent optimal policy, relative to the planner’s 
allocation under lump-sum taxes is discussed in section 7. Finally, the paper closes with 
some conclusions. 
 
2. The model economy 
We consider an economy in which firms maximize profits subject to a technology 
that produces the single consumption commodity. The stocks of private and public capital, 
tK  and ,p tK , are used together with labor, tL , as production inputs in an aggregate 
technology: 1,( )t t t p tY BK L K
α α−= . Firms pay rents t t tr K w+  to households for the use of 
private capital and labor, solving each period the static profit optimization problem: 
{ }
1
,,
( )
t t
t t t p t t t t tK L
Max BK L K r K w Lα α−Π = − − . 
We assume in what follows that population does not grow and that it is equal to the 
labor supply, which we normalize to 1: 1,= ∀tL t .  
Markets for production inputs are competitive. At each point in time, input prices are 
equal to their marginal product: 
 ( ) ( ) 1, ,, / ,t t p t t p tr r K K B K K
α
α
−
= =  (1) 
 ( ) ( ), , ,, (1 ) /t t p t t p t p tw w K K B K K K
α
α= = − , (2) 
so that real interest rates and wages are functions of the two state variables, private and 
public capital.  
The government uses the proceeds from income taxes to finance public consumption 
and to accumulate public capital. We denote by ηt   the proportion of revenues used at time t 
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to purchase public consumption, the remaining public resources being used to pay for public 
investment. The government budget constraint is ( ) ,t t t t t p tr K w g Kτ + = + , where 
 ( ) ,t t t t t tg r K wη τ= +  (3) 
 ( ), (1 )p t t t t t tK r K wη τ= − + . (4) 
In line with Barro (1990), and Cazzavillan (1996), it is public investment that is 
productive, since the same Kp,t variable enters as an argument in the production function and 
as an expenditure component in the government budget constraint. Alternatively, we could 
think of public capital as fully depreciating each period. 
Households maximize their life-time discounted aggregate utility,
0
( , )t t tt U c gρ
∞
=∑ , 
defined over private and public consumption, ct, gt, subject to a flat tax τt on total income. 
They know the current values of τt and ηt, and expect future governments to follow policies 
1 1 , 1( , )t t p tK Kτ + + += T  and 1 1 , 1( , )t t p tK Kη + + += H . The typical household solves the problem: 
 ( )
{
( )
1
, 1 1 , 1, }
, , ; ; ; ; , ( , , ; ; )
t t
t t p t t t t t t t p tc k
k K K Max U c g k K Kυ τ η ρυ
+
+ + + = + T H T H  (5) 
0given k , and subject to the budget constraint, 
 ( ) ( )1 , ,(1 ) (1 ) , , ,t t t t t t p t t t p t tc K K w K K r K K Kδ τ+  + − − = − +   (6) 
leading to the following Euler equation,2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 1 , 1, , 1 1 /c t t c t t t t p tU c g U c g B K K
α
ρ δ τ α
−
+ + + + +
 = − + −  
 in which we have already taken (1) into account: 
.        (7) 
 With homogeneous households, together with the normalization 1tL = , we have in 
equilibrium: ,t t pt ptK k K k= = , and all the variables in the model can be regarded either as 
per capita or in aggregate terms. In what follows, they will all be denoted by lower case 
letters. 
From the government budget expenditure rules and the optimality conditions for the 
competitive firms we get, 
 1, ,( , ; , )t t p t t t t t t p tg k k Bk k
α ατ η η τ −= =G , (8) 
 1, ,(1 )p t t t t p tk Bk k
α αη τ −= − , (9) 
as well as the global constraint of resources: 
                                                          
2 Along the paper we denote partial derivatives by v
FF
v
∂
≡
∂
.  
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 ( )11 , ,(1 ) (1 ) , ; ,t t t t p t t p t t tk k Bk k k kα αδ τ τ η−+ = − + − − C ,                 (10) 
where ( ),, ; ,t p t t tk k τ ηC  is the consumption function that solves the Euler equation (7).    
Substituting (9) in the technology function, aggregate output is given by 
[ ]
1
1/ (1 )t t t ty B k
α
α αη τ
−
= − . As a consequence, in the competitive equilibrium allocation, i) 
the ratio of public capital to output is equal to (1 )t tη τ− , an extension of the result in Barro 
(1990), and ii) the ratio of private capital to output is a function of (1 )t tη τ−  and structural 
parameters α and B. As is typical in the Barro family of AK models, the constant returns to 
scale in the cumulative factors are the sources of endogenous growth in our model economy.  
Finally, in competitive equilibrium we will have 
( ) ( )( ) ( ), , , ,, ; , ; , ; ; , ; ;t p t t p t t p t t p tk k k k k k k kυ υ=T H T H T H . 
 
3. Optimal policy  
3.1 The time-consistent optimal policy 
We use the same equilibrium concept as Klein, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2008) and the 
“government-moves-first” case in Ortigueira (2006).3
The government knows that the consumption policy function of the household is the 
solution to (7). Acting as a leader, it chooses the current tax rate and the split of public 
resources taking as given the policies followed by future governments and taking into 
account that reaction of the household to the policy choices, as follows: 
 We consider a dynamic game played 
by a sequence of governments, each one of them choosing current period policies on the 
basis of the state of the economy in the current period, as summarized by the aggregate stock 
of private and public capital. Hence, each government chooses the current tax rate τt and the 
proportion of revenues used to purchase public consumption, ηt, before the household 
decides on consumption and savings. When making optimal policy choices, the government 
is able to correctly anticipate the reaction of the household to policy decisions. 
 ( )
{
( ) ( )( ), , , 1 , 1, }, , ; , , , ; , ( , )t tt p t t p t t t t p t t t t p tV k k Max U k k k k V k kτ η τ η τ η ρ + + = + C G  [P1] 
where ( ), , 1, ; , ,  and t p t t t p t tk k k kτ η +G  are given by (8), (9) and (10), respectively. 
                                                          
3 Which is also used in Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999), and Krusell, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1996). 
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Proposition 1. The time consistent policy corresponding to the Markov equilibrium is the 
solution to the set of Generalized Euler Equations (GEE): 
 
( )
( )
,1 1( , ) ( , )
1
t t t t t t t t
t
t
c g c g
t t t t
t t t
t
U U U U
k k
τ τ η η
τ
η
ατ τ η τ η
α η
+ +
=
−+ Λ Ω + Ω
−
C G C G
C C
 (11) 
and 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
, ,
,
                                1 ( , )
t t t t
t t t tt t t t
t
t
t
c g
c k g kc g
t t t t
t t t t
t t k
U U
U UU U k
k
τ τ
τ τ
τ
τ
τ η τρ
τ η τ
δ τ η
+ + + +
+ + + +
+
+
+ + + +
+ +
+ 
+ + × + Ω Λ +=  
Ω Λ +   − + Ω −   
C G
C GC G C
C
C
 (12) 
where ( ) ( ) [ ](1 )/ 1/(1 ) , , (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
Bα α ατ ατ τ η τ η τ
ατ τ
−− −
Λ ≡ Ω ≡ − −
−
. 
Proof.- See Appendix 1.  
 
Equation (11) is a condition relating the optimal choice of the two policy instruments 
at a given point in time, while equation (12) characterizes the optimal intertemporal choice 
of income tax rates.  
From the aggregate constraint of resources we get the size of the reduction in time t 
investment from an increase in taxes is: ( ) ( )1 / ( , )tt t t t t t tk k kττ τ τ η+  ∂ − ∂ = − + Λ Ω t C . 
Hence, the left hand side at (11) gives the change in utility produced by a tax increase, per 
unit of crowded-out investment. This is what Ortigueira (2006) calls today’s marginal value 
of taxation. By a similar argument, the right hand side at (11) is the change in utility from an 
increase in the share of resources devoted to public consumption, per unit of crowded-out 
investment. The optimal choices of the two policy instruments must satisfy the equality 
between these two marginal effects on utility. 
The left hand side at (12) is again the marginal change in utility per unit of crowded 
out investment implied by a decrease in the tax rate. Lower taxes at t+1 stimulate 
investment, and an additional unit of capital at t+1 has a direct effect on utility of 
1 1 1 1t t t tc k g k
U U
+ + + +
+C G through its effect on private and public consumption and an indirect effect 
through its impact on time t+2 capital stock, 
1
2
1 1
1
1 ( , )
t
t
t t k
t
k
k
δ τ η
+
+
+ +
+
∂
= − + Ω −
∂
C , which needs to 
be appropriately discounted. The total effect is given by the square bracket at the right hand 
side of (12). It shows that the change in utility per unit of crowded-out investment at time t 
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implied by a marginal change in the optimal tax rate must be equal to the discounted change 
in utility resulting at time t+1. 
 
Definition.- A Markov-Perfect equilibrium is a set of functions 
, , , ,( , ; , ), ( , ),  ( , ) and ( , )t p t t t t p t t p t t p tk k k k k k V k kτ ηC T H such that:  
i) Given government rules (8) and (9), ,( , ; , )t p t t tk k τ ηC  solves the Euler equation (7) 
subject to the global constraint of resources (10), 
ii) , ,( , ),  ( , )t p t t p tk k k kT H  satisfy conditions (8), (9), the global constraint of resources 
(10), as well as the Generalized Euler Equations (11) and (12); and 
iii) ,( , )t p tV k k  is the value function of government obtained as a solution to [P1]: 
( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , 1 , 1( , ) , ; ( , ),  ( , ) , , ; ( , ),  ( , ) ( , ).t p t t p t t p t t p t t p t t p t t p t t p tV k k U k k k k k k k k k k k k V k kρ + += +C T H G T H
 
3.2 The Ramsey policy 
As usual, we define the benchmark “Ramsey equilibrium” as the solution to an 
optimal-policy problem where the government can commit to future policies. The Ramsey 
optimal policy is then the solution to the problem of maximizing the time aggregate utility  
of the household, subject to the equilibrium conditions (7), (8) and (10) as constraints: 
                                             
{
( )
( )
[ ]
, 1
1
, , , } 0
1
1 1
11
,
subject to :
(1 ) ( , )
1 ,
(1 ) .
t t t t t
t t
t
t tc g k t
t t t t t t
c c t t
t t t t t t
Max U c g
k k k c
U U
g B k
τ η
α
αα
ρ
δ τ η
ρ δ α τ η
η τ η τ
+
+
∞
=
+
+ +
−
= − + Ω −
= − + Ω  
= −
∑
 [P2] 
where (9) has been substituted in (7), (8), (10), and ( ) [ ](1 )/ 1/, (1 ) (1 )t t t t t B
α α ατ η τ η τ −Ω ≡ − − . 
The Ramsey policy takes into account the optimal reactions of private agents. 
However, it is time inconsistent, since once private agents adjust their decisions to the 
announced economic policy it will be optimal for the government to change policy. 
 Given the complexity involved in characterizing optimal policy under lack of 
commitment, attention has often been restricted to Ramsey policies, in spite of their well-
known limitation of assuming commitment on the part of the current government on future 
periods. It is therefore important to evaluate to what extent the Markov-perfect fiscal policy 
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differs from the Ramsey policy in our setup. We will perform such analysis in Section 6. In 
Appendix 2 we characterize the first order conditions and the balanced growth path for the 
Ramsey problem. 
 
4. An analytical solution: logarithmic utility and full depreciation of 
private capital 
We consider in this section the special case of logarithmic preferences that are 
separable in private and public consumption, ( ), ln lnt t t tU c g c gθ= + , together with full 
depreciation of private capital. The two assumptions together allow us to obtain an analytical 
characterization of the time consistent optimal fiscal policy that we can compare with the 
Ramsey solution as well as with the allocation that would be obtained under lump-sum 
taxes. 
Under this utility function, the competitive equilibrium allocation is characterized by 
the system: 
[ ]
1
1
1 1
( , ) ,
( , )
t t t t t
t
t t
t
k k c
c
c
τ η
ρ α τ η
+
+
+ +
= Ω − 

= Ω 

     (13) 
Proposition 2. Under full depreciation of private capital and a logarithmic utility function, 
the competitive equilibrium allocations are given by:  
 1 ( , ) ,t t t tk kρα τ η+ = Ω  (14) 
 ( )1 ( , ) .t t t tc kρα τ η= − Ω  (15) 
Proof. Plugging in the previous system (13) a guess for the functional form for the 
competitive equilibrium allocation as: 1t t tk A k+ = Ω , it is easy to show that A=ρα.  
Expressions (8) and (15) for ,t tg c  allow us to compute the partial derivatives that 
enter into the Generalized Euler equations (11)-(12), to find an analytical solution to the 
time consistent optimal policy problem.  
The next set of results shows that the Markov solution in this economy has tη  and tτ  
being constant from the initial period, implying that under the time consistent optimal 
policy, the state of the economy, defined as the ratio of public to private capital, lacks any 
transitional dynamics. We also show that there is no indeterminacy of equilibria. Hence, the 
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economy itself lacks transitional dynamics, being on the balanced growth path from the 
initial period onwards. 
Proposition 3. Under full depreciation of private capital and a logarithmic utility function, 
separable in private and public consumption, the optimal time-consistent fiscal policy 
satisfies: 
1
1
M
t M
t
tατ
η
−
= ∀
−
      (16) 
Proof.- See Appendix 3. 
Corollary 1.- Under the optimal Markov policy the state of the economy, defined as the ratio 
of public to private capital, is constant for all t. 
Proof.- Using (16) in (9), we get: , 1/ 1/(1 ) ,p t
t
k
B t
k
α αα= − ∀ . 
Proposition 4.- Under full depreciation of private capital and a logarithmic utility function, 
separable in private and public consumption, 
i) There is no indeterminacy of equilibria, 
ii) The economy lacks transitional dynamics, 
iii) The optimal Markov policy is:  
(1 )1 ,   
1
M M
t t
α ρθτ τ
θ
+
= = − ∀
+
,    (17) 
(1 ) ,   .
1 (1 )
M M
t t
αθ ρη η
α θ αρ
−
= = ∀
− + −
    (18) 
Proof-. See Appendix 3.  
Notice that the optimal split of resources between public consumption and 
investment is well defined, taking values between 0 and α, while the optimal income tax rate 
is always between 1-α and one.  
We now characterize the optimal allocation of resources in terms of the ratios of 
private and public consumption to the stock of private capital: ,t tt t
t t
c g
k k
χ φ≡ ≡ . These ratios 
must remain constant along the balanced growth path.  
Proposition 5. The optimal allocation of resources under the Markov-perfect optimal policy 
is given by:  
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( )
2 1
1/1 (1 )( , ) 1 ,
1
M
M M M Mt
t
t
k B t
k
α
αα
ρα ρθγ γ ρα τ η α
θ
−
+  +≡ = = Ω = − ∀  + 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1/1 (1 )1 ( , ) 1 ,
1
M
M M M Mt
t
t
c B t
k
α
αα
ρα α ρθ
χ χ ρα τ η α
θ
−− + 
≡ = = − Ω = − ∀  + 
 
( )
1
1/( , ) 1
1
M M M
M M M Mt
t M
t
g B t
k
α
αα
η τφ φ τ η α
τ
− 
≡ = = Ω = − ∀  − 
. 
Proof. Their expressions can readily be obtained from (8), (14) and (15).  
The three following corollaries can be readily shown from (17) and (18): 
Corollary 2. When public consumption does not enter as an argument into the utility 
function (θ=0), the Markov-perfect optimal tax rate coincides with that in Barro (1990): 
1τ α= − . In that situation, public resources are fully devoted to investment. 
Corollary 3. The Markov-perfect optimal tax rate converges to the Barro tax as the discount 
rate approaches 1, with public resources again being fully devoted to public investment. 
Corollary 4. i) The proportion of public resources devoted to public consumption increases 
with θ and α, and it decreases with ρ; ii) the optimal time consistent income tax increases 
with θ, and it decreases with α and ρ.  
As expected, the proportion of public resources devoted to consumption increases 
with the relative importance of public consumption in the utility function. It also increases 
with the output elasticity of private capital. A more productive private capital, relative to 
public capital, allows for a higher share of public resources being consumed, rather than 
invested. Turning the argument around, the more productive is public capital relative to 
private capital, the more interesting is to allocate resources to productive activities rather 
than to consumption. The share of public resources dedicated to consumption decreases for a 
larger ρ. We then tend to value future consumption almost as much as current consumption, 
and it becomes interesting to increase investment and defer consumption for the future.  
As public consumption is more appreciated by consumers for higher values of θ and 
lower values of ρ, it is appropriate to raise higher tax revenues to finance that component of 
public spending. On the contrary, a high elasticity of private capital, α, leads the private 
sector to allocate more resources to investment, and taxes can be lower.  
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4.1 Comparing Ramsey and Markov policies under logarithmic utility and full 
depreciation of private capital 
The following proposition shows that, for this special case, the Ramsey and Markov 
policies coincide.  
Proposition 6. Under a logarithmic utility function and full depreciation, the optimal 
Ramsey policy, becomes: 
(1 )1 ,
1
(1 ) .
1 (1 )
R
R
α ρθτ
θ
αθ ρη
α θ αρ
+
= −
+
−
=
− + −
 
Proof: See Appendix 3.  
The income tax and the proportion of public resources devoted to public 
consumption under the Ramsey policy coincide with the values obtained under the time-
consistent policy, so the properties analyzed in Proposition 4 and Corollaries 2 to 4 for the 
Markov-perfect optimal policy apply to the Ramsey policy as well. The equality of solutions 
arises because under a logarithmic utility and complete depreciation of physical capital the 
Ramsey policy is time consistent, a result shown by Azzimonti et al. (2009) in a neoclassical 
growth model. 
 
5. Optimal time-consistent fiscal policy under CRRA preferences and 
incomplete depreciation of private capital 
The Generalized Euler conditions (11) and (12) should incorporate the consumption 
decision rule of private agents, which is characterized as the solution to the Euler equation 
(7) of the competitive equilibrium. Unfortunately, it is not possible to find the analytical 
solution to (7) in general, and that precludes us from obtaining an analytical characterization 
of the transition towards the balanced growth path.  
Assuming a CRRA utility: 
1 (1 ) 1( , ) , 0
1
t t
t t
c gU c g
σ θ σ
σ
σ
− − −
= >
−
 the Euler condition of the 
competitive equilibrium becomes,  
 ( ) ( )
1
(1 ) (1 ) 1/
1 1 1 1 11 1 1t t t t t t tc g c g B
α
σ θ σ σ θ σ ααρ δ α τ η τ
−
− − − −
+ + + + +
 
 = − + − −  
 
, 
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or, in ratios, 
( ) ( )
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1/
1 1 1 1 11 1 1t t t t t t t t B
α
σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ ααχ φ γ ρχ φ δ α τ η τ
−
− − − − − −
+ + + + +
 
 = − + − −  
 
 , (19) 
where the growth rate is obtained from the resources constraint,  
 (1 ) ( , ) 1t t t t tγ τ Ω τ η δ χ= − + − −  (20)
   
and from (8): 
 1/ (1 ) / 1/(1 )t t t t B
α α α αφ η τ η −= − . (21) 
The right-hand side at (19) involves values at time t+1 of policy variables, 1 1,t tη τ+ + , 
and ratios of decision variables to the stock of private capital, 1 1,t tχ φ+ + . Each one of these 
must be a function of the state of the economy, , /p t tk k , so that we can think of the right-
hand side at (19) as a function ,( / )p t tF k k .  
(1 ) (1 )
,( / )t t t p t tF k k
σ θ σ σ θ σχ φ γ− − − − =     (22) 
We can now characterize the optimal Markov policy in the more general set up 
considered in this Section. We start by showing that the relationship between the two policy 
instruments is the same we found under logarithmic preferences and full depreciation of 
private capital. As shown in Appendix 4, the function ,( / )p t tF k k  cancels out in the 
Generalized Euler equation (11) that relates both policy choices. As a consequence, 
,( / )p t tF k k does not play any role in the characterization of the relationship between tτ  and 
tη . 
Proposition 7.- The time-consistent optimal choice of the two policy instruments satisfies: 
1 ,
1t t
tατ
η
−
= ∀
−
,      (23) 
Proof.- See Appendix 4. 
Therefore, the two policy variables satisfy at all periods the same relationship we 
already obtained for the simple economy with logarithmic preferences and full depreciation 
of capital. Again, optimal income tax rates will be above 1 α− , whereas the optimal 
proportion of public resources devoted to consumption will always be below α. 
Even more importantly, the relationship (23) implies again that the ratio of the two 
state variables, private and public capital, is constant over time.  
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Corollary 5.- In the absence of equilibrium indeterminacy, the Markov perfect solution lacks 
any transitional dynamics. 
Proof: Since the ratio of each control variable to private capital can only depend on the 
ratio of the two state variables, , /p t tk k , the fact that this ratio is constant implies that the 
ratios of private and public consumption to capital will also be constant. Hence, in the 
absence of indeterminacy of equilibria, the economy will always be on its balanced growth 
path, displaying no transition.  
Equilibrium indeterminacy in this model can only be analyzed numerically. Local 
indeterminacy depends on the dynamic properties of the solution to the second Generalized 
Euler condition (12). Substituting (22) in (12) and using the fact that the ratio , /p t tk k  is 
constant over time, equation (12) becomes, 
( ) ( )
1
1
1
(1 ) 1
1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
(1 ) .
(1 ) (1 )
, ,
(1 ) (1 )
t t
t t
t t
t t
t t t
t t
t t t t
t t t t
τ τ
θ σ σ
τ τ
χ χ θ χ χ θ
ατ ατ
ργ θ χ γ
τ α τ α
χ τ η χ τ η
ατ τ ατ τ
+
+
+
− − +
+ + +
+
+ +
+ +
+ +
= + +
− − − −
+ Ω + Ω
− −
 
 
 
 
  
 (24) 
 The partial derivative 
tτ
χ  is shown in Appendix 4 (expression A4.2) to be a function 
of tγ  and tχ . Thus, using (A4.2), as well as (20)-(23) in equation (24), we obtain a single, 
first order, nonlinear difference equation in tη .  
The dynamic properties of (24) can be analyzed through the eigenvalue of the 
linearized version of this equation. An eigenvalue below 1 would suggest an indetermination 
of equilibrium since in that case, we would need an initial condition for η (that is, η0) in 
order to compute the time series for tη . Any arbitrary choice for η0 would yield a valid 
Markov equilibrium, and we would then have indeterminacy of equilibria. That would 
produce transitional dynamics, as the trajectory followed by the economy would depend on 
the choice for η0. On the other hand, an eigenvalue greater than one would imply that the 
only stable solution is obtained with tη  being constant over time: ,t tη η= ∀ , without 
indeterminacy of equilibria.  
We have numerically computed such eigenvalue for wildly different 
parameterizations, obtaining always a value above one, even for empirically implausible 
parameter values. Lacking an analytical proof, our numerical analysis suggests that there is 
not indeterminacy of equilibria, with ,t tη η= ∀ , and hence, , , ,t t t t tτ τ γ γ φ φ χ χ= = = = ∀ , 
the economy being at each point in time on its balanced growth path.  
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5.1 Solving for the Markov equilibrium 
The consumption policy rule ,( , ; , )t p t t tk k τ ηC  is the solution to the competitive 
equilibrium Euler equation under the global constraint of resources. Since the ratio of private 
to public capital and the optimal policy instruments ,t tτ η  are constant over time, we have: 
( ),
( , ; , )
,t p t t t
t
k k
k
τ η
χ τ η=
C
. 
Evaluating the Euler equation in ratios (19) along the balanced growth path and using 
(23), we get: ( ) 1/( (1 ))1 ( , ) σ θ σγ ρ δ α τ η − −= − + Ω    . Taking this expression to (20), we get:  
 ( ) ( ) 1/( (1 )), 1 ( , ) 1 ( , ) σ θ σχ τ η δ τ η ρ δ α τ η − −= − + Ω − − + Ω   . (25) 
with partial derivatives  and τ ηχ χ  :  
 
1 (1 )
( ) ( , ) 1
(1 )
σ θ σ
τ
χ ραγχ τ τ η
τ σ θ σ
− + − ∂
≡ = Λ Ω − ∂ − − 
, (26) 
 
1 (1 )1 ( , ) 1
(1 ) (1 )
σ θ σ
η
χ α ραγχ τ η
η α η σ θ σ
− + − ∂ −
≡ = Ω − ∂ − − − 
. (27) 
where ( ) (1 ) .
(1 )
τ ατ
ατ τ
− −
Λ ≡
−
  
 Finally, the Markov equilibrium { }, , , ,M M M M Mγ χ φ τ η  is obtained as the solution to 
the system (20), (21), (23), (24) and (25) evaluated along the balanced growth path. The 
system can only be solved numerically and the following section is devoted to analyze its 
properties under several parameterizations. Under all parameterizations considered, the 
system has been shown to have a single solution,4
 
 suggesting that the equilibrium is globally 
determined. 
6. Comparing the Ramsey and Markov solutions in the general case 
Let us now compare the Markov and Ramsey solutions between themselves, as well 
as with the allocation of resources that would be achieved by a benevolent planner using 
                                                          
4 When solving the nonlinear system of equations, we have tried very different sets of initial conditions, always 
reaching the same solution shown in the Tables. 
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lump-sum taxes, which is characterized in Appendix 5. We will use ,t p tPt
t
g k
y
τ
+
=  as a 
measure of the size of the public sector in the planner solution and we will use 
,
P t
t
t p t
g
g k
η =
+
 for the composition of public expenditures. Both of them will be used in the 
graphs and tables we present below. 
Let us now examine the values taken by the main variables in the economy along the 
balanced growth path under the three alternative fiscal policies: i) the planner’s policy under 
lump-sum taxes, ii) the Ramsey policy and iii) the time-consistent policy, all of them under 
the more general setup, with a CRRA utility function and incomplete depreciation of private 
capital. Unfortunately, our results are not readily comparable with those in the literature 
because numerical results are usually derived using a logarithmic, separable utility function, 
whereas our results correspond to general CRRA utility functions, and also because of our 
consideration of endogenous growth. 
The Markov equilibrium is obtained as explained in section 5.1. As shown in 
Appendix 2, the solution to the Ramsey problem [P2] is characterized by a system of 8 
dynamic equations in { }1 2 3, , , , , , ,γ χ φ η τ µ µ µ    that allows us to compute the balanced growth 
path for the Ramsey policy ( , )R Rτ η  as well as the implied allocation of resources, 
characterized by ( , , )R R Rγ χ φ and three multipliers, { }1 2 3, ,µ µ µ   . That system is made up 
only by control variables, with no participation of any state variable. Hence, in the absence 
of local indeterminacy of equilibrium, the only possible solution is that control variables 
stay on the balanced growth path (BGP) from the initial period, with no transition.  
Under incomplete depreciation of private capital, the choice of parameter values: 
0.4, 1 0.20, 0.99, 0.10, 0.4555,Bθ α ρ δ= − = = = = when generating annual data lead to 
sensible properties of the Markov solution. Parameter values are standard in the literature for 
annual data except for θ , which is chosen so that the ratio of public consumption to private 
consumption for the Markov solution is in line with data for the postwar US economy 
(g/c=0.25). For instance, for 2σ = , we get a ratio of public to private consumption around 
0.25, an annual growth rate γ =1.5%, and a gross real interest rate: ( )(1 )(1 )1/ 1.03σ θργ − + ≈ . 
The value chosen for α is consistent with a broad concept of capital that includes both 
physical and human components, as it is commonly established in endogenous growth 
models with public and private capital (see Cazzavillian, 1996). As to the elasticity of output 
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with respect to public capital, 1-α, we set a value which is in line with previous literature: 
Azzimonti et al. (2009) takes a benchmark elasticity of 0.25, but the range of values varies 
significantly across authors between the 0.03 estimated by Eberts (1986), and the 0.39 
estimated by Aschauer (1989).  
Figure 1 shows values for the main variables in the economy under the three 
equilibrium concepts as a function of the risk aversion parameter, σ. Over the whole range of 
values considered, the optimal income tax increases with risk aversion. It always falls 
between 20% and 30%, being higher under the Markov-perfect policy than under the time-
inconsistent Ramsey policy. The proportion of public resources devoted to consumption, 
relative to investment, is also increasing in σ, staying between 6% and 32%. It is also higher 
under the Markov-perfect solution than under the Ramsey policy.  
Steady state growth is slightly higher under the Ramsey policy. Growth rates are 
large for low values of the risk aversion parameter, but they become quite realistic for values 
of σ above 1.5. As a proportion of output, private consumption is higher under the Ramsey 
policy, while public consumption is higher under the Markov policy. In terms of specific 
values, private consumption never exceeds 35% of output under either policy, while public 
consumption remains below 10% of output, both observations below the levels observed in 
actual economies. However, the public to private consumption ratio is around 25%, as in 
observed data. For the Markov and Ramsey solutions we could obtain ratios of public and 
private consumption to output similar to those in actual data, at the expense of getting 
income tax rates implausibly high.  
A planner with access to lump-sum taxes under commitment would devote an even 
higher proportion of public resources to consumption than the Markov and Ramsey 
solutions, and the growth rate would be considerably higher than under the alternative 
solutions. 
That the income tax is higher under the Markov-perfect policy than under the 
Ramsey solution is consistent with the result obtained by Ortigueira (2006) in an exogenous 
growth economy under inelastic labor supply.5
                                                          
5 Even though the two results are not strictly comparable, since one of them refers to an exogenous growth 
economy and the other to an endogenous growth economy. 
 This result arises because the Markovian 
government cannot internalize the distortionary effects of current taxation on past 
investment, while in the Ramsey solution, the government takes fully into account the 
negative effect of the income tax on future investment. A similar argument explains that the 
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Markov government devotes a higher proportion of public resources to consumption, which 
has a direct impact on current utility, to the expense of public investment, which would have 
a positive effect on future utility. A lower income tax rate and a higher share of investment 
in public expenditures make the growth rate to be higher under the Ramsey than under the 
Markov solution.  
Figure 2 presents results for σ = 2, and values of the relative weight of public 
consumption in the utility function, θ, between 0.2 and 1.5, the remaining parameters being 
as in Figure 1. As expected, public consumption as a share of total public spending increases 
with θ. Qualitative results stay the same, with the Markov-perfect policy imposing a higher 
income tax than the Ramsey policy and devoting a higher proportion of public resources to 
consumption. The growth rate is again higher under the Ramsey than under the Markov 
policy. 
Table 1 summarizes the results by displaying a single point from Figure 1 and Figure 
2. Table 2 analyzes the effects of a change in α. The value of B has been chosen to guarantee 
positive growth rates under the Markov and Ramsey solutions. 
Since the resource allocations obtained under the three solution concepts satisfy the 
conditions for competitive equilibrium, the fact that the ratio of public capital to output is 
the same for the three solutions means that the product (1 )η τ−  is also the same for the three 
solution concepts. This property implies that the ratio of private capital to output is also the 
same for the three solutions under any parameterization. The common value of (1 )η τ−  
turns out to be equal to the elasticity of output with respect to public capital, again an 
extension of the result obtained by Barro (1990) in a model with just public capital. 
The solution under lump-sum taxes leads to the largest public sector and devotes a 
lowest share of public resources to investment. Since taxes are not distortionary under the 
planner’s solution, a larger proportion of resources extracted by the public sector can be 
made compatible with a higher rate of growth. 
The comparison between the two panels in Table 1 shows what happens as public 
consumption becomes more important in the utility function: while the ratios of both types 
of capital to output remain unchanged, the optimal tax rate increases, as it does the 
proportion of public resources devoted to consumption. These two changes lead to a lower 
rate of growth. 
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Table 1. Values for the main variables under the three solution concepts. 
Effects of a change in θ 
 
 B = 0.4555, σ = 2.00,  
θ = 0.40, α = 0.80, 
δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.99 
B = 0.4555, σ = 2.00, 
θ = 1.00, α = 0.80, 
δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.99 
 Planner Markov Ramsey Planner Markov Ramsey 
η (%) 
τ (%) 
γ (%) 
c/y(%) 
g/y(%) 
kp/y(%) 
k/y 
26.7 
27.3       
3.6   
18.3  
7.3    
20.0    
4.0 
24.9    
26.6    
1.5    
27.4    
6.6  
20.0    
4.0 
20.4    
25.1    
1.6    
28.4   
5.1    
20.0    
4.0 
41.6   
34.2    
2.9    
14.3     
14.3    
20.0    
4.0 
38.7   
32.6    
0.8    
24.2    
12.6   
20.0   
4.0 
30.9   
28.9     
1.1     
26.9 
8.9     
20.0    
4.0 
 
 
Table 2. Values for the main variables under the three solution concepts. 
Effects of a change in α 
 
 B = 0.658, σ = 2.00, 
θ = 0.40, α = 0.80,  
δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.99 
B =0.658, σ = 2.00, 
θ = 0.40, α = 0.70, 
δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.99 
 Planner Markov Ramsey Planner Markov Ramsey 
η (%) 
τ (%) 
γ (%) 
c/y(%) 
g/y(%) 
kp/y(%) 
k/y 
32.9   
29.8    
8.1    
24.6   
9.8    
20.0    
2.5 
32.1   
29.4   
4.5    
33.9    
9.5    
20.0    
2.5 
28.9   
28.1    
4.7    
34.8    
8.1    
20.0    
2.5 
19.2   
37.1    
4.8    
17.9    
7.1    
30.0    
3.0 
16.9   
36.1   
1.5    
28.9    
6.1     
30.0 
3.0 
13.1   
34.5     
1.6     
30.0     
4.5     
30.0     
3.0 
Note to the tables: for the planner solution ,t p tPt
t
g k
y
τ
+
=  and 
,
P t
t
t p t
g
g k
η =
+
. 
 
Table 2 shows that an increase in the productivity of public capital (lower α) leads to 
higher tax rates. The government detracts more aggregate resources from the economy and 
devotes a larger proportion of them to investment. Because of the increase in the tax rate 
generated by a lower α parameter, the productivity of private capital and hence, the rate of 
growth, both decrease. 
 
7.  Welfare   
In this section we compute the level of welfare that would arise along the balanced 
growth path under the time consistent Markov policy and compare it with the level of 
welfare that would be obtained under lump-sum taxes.6
                                                          
6 We do not consider the level of welfare under the Ramsey solution because of its time-inconsistent nature. 
 As in Lucas (1987), what we 
compute is the consumption compensation (as a percentage of output) that would be needed 
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under the Markov rule to achieve the same level of welfare than under the resource 
allocation of the planner with non-distortionary taxation. 
Under a CRRA utility, welfare can be written, 
1 (1 ) 1 1
, ,
(1 )(1 )
0
1 1 1 , ,
1 1 1 1
t i t it i i
i
t i
c g
W i Planner Markov
σ θ σ σ σ
σ θ
χ φ
ρ
σ σ ρ γ ρ
− − − −∞
− +
=
−  
= = − = − − − − 
∑ . 
Let {ct,i, gt,i} , i=P,M, be the optimal path for private and public consumption for the 
planner’s solution and the Markov solution, respectively, that is: 
 


0
0
, , 0
1
, , 0
1
,
, ,
t t
t i i t i i i i i
k
t t
t i i t i i i i i
k
c k k
g k k i P M
χ χ γ χ γ
φ φ γ φ γ
=
=
= = =
= = = =
 
where we have indicated the normalization 0k =1.  
The consumption compensation λ needed for the Markov solution to achieve the 
same level of welfare as under the planner’s allocation can be obtained by solving the 
following equation: 
1 1 (1 )
, ,
0
(1 ) 1
,
1
t M t Mt
P
t
c g
W
σ σ θ σλ
ρ
σ
− − −∞
=
+ −
=
−∑  
that is, 
1 1 1 1 1
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )1 1 1 1 ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
P P M M
P M
σ σ σ σ σ
σ θ σ θ
χ φ λ χ φ
σ ρ γ ρ σ ρ γ ρ
− − − − −
− + − +
   +
− = −   − − − − − −   
 and finally, 
1
(1 )(1 ) 1
(1 )(1 )
11 .
1
M P P
P M M
θσ θ σ
σ θ
ρ γ χ φ
λ
ρ γ χ φ
− + −
− +
   −
+ =   −   
    (28) 
 To translate this compensation into output units, we have to compute ,
,
100 t M
t M
c
y
λ , 
which is the compensation shown in Figure 3. 
As the risk aversion parameter changes between 1 and 5, the Markov consumption 
compensation falls from 45% to 3% of output. In particular, for σ = 2, the compensation that 
would be necessary to achieve the planner’s welfare is around 8% of output. By and large, 
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the decrease in consumption compensation is due to the decline in the value of the first 
factor in (28).7
The consumption compensation increases with θ. For σ=2, the Markov consumption 
compensation increases from 6% to 23% of output. Again, this increase in the consumption 
compensation is mainly due to the first factor in (28).
  
8
 
 So, the difference in growth rates is 
the main determinant of the welfare loss of the Markov solution relative to the planner’s 
solution, over and above the effects of differences in the ratios of private or public 
consumption to output. 
8. Conclusions 
We have characterized the optimal Markov-perfect fiscal policy in an endogenous 
growth economy with public consumption and capital in which the fiscal authority cannot 
commit to policy choices beyond the current period. We have considered two policy 
variables: a single tax on total income and the split of public resources between investment 
and consumption.  
Under logarithmic preferences and full depreciation of capital, we can analytically 
characterize the optimal values of the two policy variables. With that particular 
specification, we show that the Markov-perfect policy coincides with the optimal Ramsey 
policy that would arise by imposing commitment. The optimal policy reduces to that of 
Barro if we assume away public consumption.  
For the more general case of a CRRA utility function and less than perfect 
depreciation of private capital, we show the economy to be on its balanced growth path from 
the initial period onwards. In this case there is no closed form solution, but we compute 
numerical values for the Markov-perfect and the Ramsey optimal policies under parameter 
values calibrated to the US economy. We also explore the sensitivity of the numerical 
solutions to the values of three parameters: the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption, the relative weight of public consumption in agents’ utility function and the 
elasticity of output with respect to private capital. For empirically plausible parameter 
                                                          
7 The first factor, which depends on growth rates, falls from 17.13 for σ=1.1, to 1.23 for σ=5. The second factor 
increases from 0.29 to 0.86, while the third factor initially increases from its starting value of 1.018 to 1.054, 
and it decreases after that to essentially its same initial level. 
8 The first factor increases from 1.72 to 3.02 as θ changes from 0.2 to 1.5. The second factor gradually 
decreases from 0.70 to 0.54, and the third factor shows a moderate increase, from 1.13 to 1.23 
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values, the income tax is higher under the Markov policy than under the Ramsey solution, 
and a higher proportion of public resources are devoted to consumption. Consequently, the 
growth rate is lower under the Markov policy than under the Ramsey solution. 
The welfare loss of the Markov solution relative to the planner’s allocation is mainly 
determined by the differences in growth rates, more than by differences in the ratios of 
private or public consumption to output. 
The implication of our results is that if the private sector is aware of the government's 
inability to pledge future policy decisions, then the government should impose a slightly 
higher tax rate and devote a higher share of public resources to consumption, with a 
relatively low cost in terms of growth.  
Considering a more complex tax structure, as well as non-trivial transitional 
dynamics in an endogenous growth model with public debt, are left as future extensions of 
this work. 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
First order optimality conditions for the government’s problem are: 
• with respect to τ: 
1
( , ) 0
t t t t t t
t t
c g k t
t
U U V kτ τ τ
τ η
ρ
τ+
 ∂Ω
+ + − = ∂ 
C G C , 
where: 
[ ]
1
1/( , ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( , ) ( )
(1 )
t t t
t t t t t t
t t t
B
α
αα
τ η τ α
τ η τ τ η τ
τ ατ τ
−∂Ω − −
= − − = −Ω Λ
∂ −
, 
so that: 
 ( )1 ( , ) ( )t t t t t tc g k t t t tU U V kτ τ τρ τ η τ++ = Ω Λ +C G C   
• with respect to η: 
 
1
( , ) 0
t t t t t t
t t
c g k t
t
U U V kη η η
τ η
ρ
η+
 ∂Ω
+ + − = ∂ 
C G C , 
where: 
[ ]
1
1/( , ) 1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) ( , )
1 1
t t
t t t t t
t t t
B
α
αα
τ η α ατ η τ τ η
η α η α η
−∂Ω − −
= − − − = −Ω
∂ − −
, 
so that: 
 
1
1 1( , )
1t t t t t tc g k t t tt
U U V kη η η
αρ τ η
α η+
 −
+ = Ω + − 
C G C .  
 
The envelope condition is: 
 
1
( , ) ( , )        1 ( , ) ,
t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
k c k c g k g
t t t t
t t t t t t
k t t k t t
t t t t
V U U U U
k k k k
V k k
k k
τ η τ η
τ η
τ η τ η
τ η τ τ η η
ρ δ τ η
τ η+
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + + + + +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
    ∂Ω ∂ ∂Ω ∂
− + Ω − + − + −    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
C C C G G G
C C C
 
 
which, after using the first order conditions derived above, it can be written as 
 
1
1 ( , ) .
t t t t t t tk c k g k k t t k
V U U Vρ δ τ η
+
 = + + − + Ω − C G C  
From the optimality conditions above we get, 
25 
( ) ( )
( )
1
1
,
,
,1 1,
1
t t t t
t
t
t t t t
t
t
c g
k
t t t t
c g
k
t t t
t
U U
V
k
U U
V
k
τ τ
τ
η η
η
ρ
τ η τ
ρ
ατ η
α η
+
+
+
=
Ω Λ +
+
=
−
Ω +
−
C G
C
C G
C
 
which leads to condition (11). 
Plugging the first equation into the envelope condition we get, 
 
( ) ( )
1 ( , ) ,
,
t t t t
t t t t t t
t
c g
k c k g k t t k
t t t t
U U
V U U
k
τ τ
τ
δ τ η
τ η τ
+
 = + + − + Ω − Ω Λ +
C G
C G C
C
 
and, finally, we get equation (12): 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
, .
,
                                1 ( , )
t t t t
t t t tt t t t
t
t
t
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t t t t
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t t k
U U
U UU U k
k
τ τ
τ τ
τ
τ
τ η τρ
τ η τ
δ τ η
+ + + +
+ + + +
+
+
+ + + +
+ +
+ 
+ + × + Ω Λ +=  
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Appendix 2: Optimal Ramsey policy under a CRRA utility function and incomplete 
depreciation of private capital 
The Ramsey optimal policy is the solution to the utility maximization problem, 
subject to the equilibrium conditions as constraints. Under the CRRA utility function, the 
Lagrangian for the Ramsey problem becomes: 
( )
( )
( )
1 (1 )
1 1
0
1
1/ 1/
2
(1 ) (1 )
3 1 1 1 1
1 1 ( , )
1
            1
            1 ( , ) .
t tt t
t t t t t t
t
t
t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t
c gL k c k
B k g
c g c g
σ θ σ
α
α αα
σ θ σ σ θ σ
ρ ρ µ δ τ η
σ
ρ µ η η τ
ρ µ ρ δ α τ η
− −∞
+
=
−
− − − −
+ + + +
−
= + − + Ω − − +  −
 − − +  
 − + Ω − 
∑
 
Taking the derivatives with respect to 1, , , ,t t t t tc g k τ η+  to be equal to zero, we obtain 
the optimality conditions for the Ramsey problem: 
 ( )(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )1 3 3, 1 1 ( , )t t t t t t t t t t tc g c g c gσ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σµ µ σ σµ δ α τ η− − − − − − − −−= − + − + Ω ,  
 ( )(1 ) 1 (1 )2 3 3, 1(1 ) 1 ( , )t t t t t t t t tc g c gσ θ σ σ θ σθ µ σ θ µ µ δ α τ η− − − − − − = − − − − + Ω  ,  
 ( )
1
1/ 1/
1 1, 1 1 1 2, 1 1 1 11 ( , ) (1 )t t t t t t t tB
α
α α αµ ρ µ δ τ η µ τ η η
−
+ + + + + + +
 
= − + Ω + − 
 
,  
 (1 )1 2 3 1
1 11 1 11 1 0
t
t t
t t t t t t t
t t
k k c gσ θ στ τα αµ µ η µ α
α τ α α τ
− −
−
   − −− −
− + + − =   
   
,  
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 ( )(1 )1 2 3 1
1 1 1 0
1 t
t t
t t t t t t
t
k k c gσ θ σα τ ηµ µ µ α
α τ α
− −
−
−  − + − − − = −  
.  
Transforming the multipliers by: (1 ) (1 ) 31 1 2 2 3, , ,tt t t t t
t
k k
k
σ θ σ σ θ σ µµ µ µ µ µ− − − −≡ ≡ ≡   and 
defining the rate of growth 11 tt
t
k
k
γ ++ = , the consumption to capital ratio tt
t
c
k
χ = , and the ratio 
between public and private capital: tt
t
g
k
φ = , we can get a system of equations in stationary 
ratios. First, from the global constraint of resources, we get an expression for the growth 
rate: 
1 1 ( , )t t t tγ δ τ η χ+ = − + Ω − . 
Whereas from the government budget constraint, we can write the ratio of public to 
private capital: 
1
1/ 1/ (1 )t t t tB
α
α α αφ τ η η
−
= − . 
From the Euler equation for the competitive equilibrium: 
( )
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 1 1 11 ( , )t tt t t t tx x
σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σφ γ ρ φ δ α τ η
+
− − − − − −
+ + + += − + Ω   , 
and from the set of optimality conditions above, we finally get the system of equations 
characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy represented in stationary ratios: 
 ( )(1 ) 1 (1 )1 3 3 1
1 1 ( , ) ,
t tt t t t t t t
t
x xσ θ σ σ θ σφ µ σ φ µ µ δ α τ η
γ
− − − − −
−
 
= − − − + Ω   
 
    
 ( )1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 12 3 3 1
1(1 ) 1 ( , ) ,
t tt t t t t t t
t
x xσ θ σ σ θ σθ φ µ σ θ φ µ µ δ α τ η
γ
− − − − − −
−
 
= − − − − + Ω   
 
     
 ( )
1
(1 ) 1/ 1/
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 11 ( , ) (1 ) ,t t t t t t t tB
α
θ σ σ α α αµ ργ µ δ τ η µ τ η
−
− −
+ + + + + + +
 
= − + Ω + − 
 
     
 (1 )1 2 3 1
1 11 1 1 11 1 0,
t
t t
t t t t t
t t t
x σ θ στ τα αµ µ η µ φ α
α τ α γ α τ
− −
−
   − −− −
− + + − =   
   
     
 ( )(1 )1 2 3 1
1 11 1 0.
1 t
t t
t t t t
t t
σ θ στ ηαµ µ µ χ φ α
α τ α γ
− −
−
−  − + − − − = −  
     
Along the balanced growth path, the system of equations for the Ramsey equilibrium 
becomes: 
 ( )(1 ) 1 ( , ) ,σ θ σγ ρ δ α τ η− − = − + Ω   
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 1 ( , ) ,χ δ τ η γ= − + Ω −   
 
1
1/ 1/ (1 ) ,B
α
α α αφ τ η η
−
= −   
 ( )(1 )1 3
1 11 1 ( , ) 1 ,xσ θ σµ φ µ σ δ α τ η
χ γ
− −  = + − + Ω − 
 
   
 ( )1 1 (1 )2 3
1 1 11 1 ( , ) 1 ,tx
σ θ σ σµ φ µ δ α τ η
θ χ γ
− − −  −= − − + Ω − 
 
    
 ( )
1
(1 ) (1 ) 1/ 1/
1 21 1 ( , ) (1 ) ,B
α
θ σ σ θ σ σ α α αµ ργ δ τ η ργ µ τ η η
−
− − − − − − + Ω = −     
 (1 )2 3
1 1 1 1 1 11 1 0,x σ θ σα τ α τµ η µ φ α
α τ α γ α τ
− −− − − −   − + + − =   
   
    
 ( )(1 )1 2 3
1 11 1 0
1
σ θ σα τ ηµ µ µ χ φ α
α τ α γ
− −−  − + − − − = −  
   .  
Denoting by: 
[ ]1 1 ( , ) 1δ α τ η
γ
Ψ = − + Ω − , 1 ( , )F δ τ η= − + Ω , and 
(1 )
(1 )
1 Fθ σ σ
θ σ σ
ργ
ργ φ
− −
− −
−
Γ = , 
we characterize the balanced growth path of the Ramsey equilibrium by particularizing the 
system of equations above to: 
( ){ }
1
(1 )
1
1/ 1/
1
(1 )
2 1
(1 )
1
3
1 ( , ) ,
1 ( , ) ,
(1 ) ,
1/ ,
1 1
,
1 ,
/
B
σ θ σ
α
α α α
σ θ σ
σ θ σ
γ ρ δ α τ η
χ δ τ η γ
φ τ η η
σµ
φ σχ φ
θ χ σ
µ µ
χ φ µ
µ
σ χ
− −
−
− −
− −
= − + Ω  
= − + Ω −
= −
=
 Γ −
+ 
 
= Γ
−
=
Ψ

 


 
(1 )
1 3 2
(1 )
1 2 3
1 1 1 11 0,
1 11 (1 ) 0,
1
σ θ σ
σ θ σ
α τ
µ µ χ φ α µ η
γ α τ α
α τ η
µ µ µ χ φ α
α τ α γ
− −
− −
  − − + − + =    
−  − + − − − = −  
  
  
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a system of 8 equations in { }1 2 3, , , , , , ,γ χ φ η τ µ µ µ    that allows us to compute the balanced 
growth path for the Ramsey policy ( , )R Rτ η  as well as the implied allocation of resources, 
characterized by ( , , )R R Rγ χ φ . 
 
Appendix 3.- Proofs of propositions 3, 4 and 6 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The problem solved by the government is: 
 
{ }
[ ]1,
1
( ) Max ln ( , , ) ln ( , , ) ( )
where   ( , ) ( , , ),
( , , ) (1 ) ( , ) ,
( , , ) ( , ) .
1
t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t
t t t t t t
t
V k k k V k
k k k
k k
k k
τ η
τ η θ τ η ρ
τ η τ η
τ η ρα τ η
η τ
τ η τ η
τ
+
+
= + +
= Ω −
= − Ω
= Ω
−
C G
C
         C
         G
 
The first order conditions for this problem are: 
 [ ]
1
: (1 ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) 0
(1 ) tt t k t t t tt t
V kθτ θ τ ρ ρα τ η τ
τ τ +
− + Λ + − Ω Λ =
−
, (A3.1) 
 
1
1 1 1 1: (1 ) ( , ) 0
1 1tt k t t tt t t
V kα θ αη θ ρ ρα τ η
α η η α η+
 − −
− + + − Ω = − − 
, (A3.2) 
From (A3.1) and (A3.2) we obtain a relationship between the optimal values of the 
tax rate and the government spending split in the Markov-perfect equilibrium: 
 1
1
M
t M
t
tατ
η
−
= ∀
−
. (A3.3) 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
i) To examine the dynamic properties of the Markov solution, we consider the envelope 
condition : 
 
1
( , )1 1(1 ) (1 )
( , )
( , )1 1        ( , ) ,
(1 )
t
t
t t t t
k
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
k t t
t t t t t t t t
V
k k k
V
k k k k
τ η τ η
θ θ
τ η τ
τ η τ η τ η
θ ρ ρα τ η
τ τ η τ+
 ∂Ω ∂ ∂
= + + + + + Ω ∂ ∂ ∂ 
     ∂ ∂ ∂Ω ∂ ∂
+ + Ω + +      − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂      
 
 
which, using conditions (A3.1) and (A3.2), the envelope can be written as, 
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 [ ]
1
1(1 ) ( , )
t tk k t t
t
V V
k
θ ρ ρα τ η
+
= + + Ω . (A3.4) 
Using (A3.2) and (A3.3) in (A3.4), we obtain the dynamic equation: 
 1
1 1 0,t t
θη η
ρ ρ−
+
− + =   (A3.5) 
1where  
(1 )
t
t
t
ηθαη
α η
−
≡
−
 . The solution to the difference equation (A3.5) is unstable, since 
1/ 1ρ > .  
Hence the only stable solution is that tη  stays constant over time, and the same 
applies to tη , that is, ,t tη η= ∀ .  
 
ii)  The ratio to private capital of each control variable can only depend on the ratio of 
the two state variables, , /p t tk k . Since this ratio is constant under the optimal Markov policy 
(Corollary 1), tχ  and tφ  will also be constant. Together with the absence of indeterminacy, 
this result implies that the economy lacks transitional dynamics, being on the balanced 
growth path from the initial period on. 
 
iii)     From (A3.5) we obtain the value of η : 
 (1 )
1 (1 )
M αθ ρη
α θ αρ
−
=
− + −
,  
and using (A3.3), we obtain the Markov perfect optimal tax rate:9
 
 
(1 )1
1
M α ρθτ
θ
+
= −
+
.  
Proof of proposition 6:   
Particularizing the system of equations for the balanced growth path under the 
optimal Ramsey policy obtained in Appendix 2 to the case of a logarithmic utility function 
(σ=1) and full depreciation (δ=1), we obtain: 
                                                          
9 Malley et al. (2002) obtain a similar expression for the Markov perfect tax rate. 
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

 
together with: 
1 3 2
1 2 3
1 1 1 0,
1 11 (1 ) 0.
1
α τµ µ α µ η
γχ ατ α
α τ ηµ µ µ χ α
α τ α γ
  − −
+ + = 
 
−  − + − − − = −  
  
  
 
Substituting the expressions for the Lagrange multipliers into the last two equations 
gives us: 
[ ]
[ ]
1
1 1
1/ 1/ 1/
1
1 1
1/
1 1 1 1 0,1 1(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
11 11 1 (1 ) 0.
1 1(1 )(1 ) (1 ) 1
B B
B
α α
α α αα α
α
α α
χµθ α τ θα η
γ ατ ατ α τ η τ η ηρ
χµθ α τ ηα α
α ρχ φ τ ατ α τ η γ
ρ
− −
− −
 
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 − + + =
 −− − − − 
 
 −  −−  − − − − =  −    − − − −    


 
Finally leading to the system: 
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11
1 (1 ) (1 ) 0,
1 1
(1 ) .(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
1
R R
R
R
R
ρα θθ α α τ θ τ
α ρ
θα τη
ρθ α τ α
ρ
−
+
−− + − − + − =
− −
−
=
+ −
+ − −
−
 
The first equation yields the Ramsey-optimal tax rate as a function of the structural 
parameters α, θ, ρ, while the second equation gives us the associated optimal split of public 
resources. It is easy to see that the solution to this system is given by, 
(1 )1 ,
1
(1 ) .
1 (1 )
R
R
α ρθτ
θ
αθ ρη
α θ αρ
+
= −
+
−
=
− + −
 
 
Appendix 4.- Optimal Markov policy 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
Taking into account that (1 ) ( , ) 1t t t t tγ τ Ω τ η δ χ= − + − −  , and 
1/ (1 )/ 1/(1 )t t t t B
α α α αφ η τ η −= − , 
we get partial derivatives: 
( ) ( )
1; ;
(1 )
,1 1, ; ; 1,
(1 ) 1
t t
t t t
t
t t
t t t
t tt
t t
t t t
η τ
τ η χ
α η
φ φ φ φ
αη η ατ
η τα τ αγ η τ γ γ
ατ τ α η
−
= =
−
Ω− − −
= Ω = − = −
− −
 
Under CRRA preferences the first Generalized Euler condition (11) becomes: 
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
1 1( ) ( , ) ( , )
1
t t t t
t
t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t
t
c g C c g G c g C c g G
C k C k
σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ
τ τ η η
τ
η
θ θ
ατ τ η τ η
α η
− − − − − − − − − −+ +
=
−+ Λ Ω + Ω
−
  
which can be written in terms of ratios using the equalities: 
; ; ;
t t t t t t t tt t t t
C k C k G k G kτ τ η η τ τ η ηχ χ φ φ= = = = , as:  
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
1
1 1( ) ( , ) ( , )
1
t t
t t
t
t
t t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t
t t
t
kk k
σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ
σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ η η
τ τ
τ
η
χ φ χ θχ φ φχ φ χ θχ φ φ φ
αχ τ τ η χ τ η
α η
− − − + − − − −
− − − + − − − − − + − ++
=
−+ Λ Ω + Ω
−
and, after cancelling out the product (1 ) (1 )t t t
σ θ σ σ θ σχ φ γ− − − − at both sides of the equality, we are 
left with: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
1
(1 )
,, 1
1
t t
t
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t
t t
t t t
t tt t t
t
τ η
τ
η
α ηχ θχ χ θχ
ατ αη η
η τχ τ η τ αχ
α η
−
+ +
−
=
Ω+ Λ Ω −
+
−
 (A4.1) 
To further elaborate on this optimality condition, we need to compute the partial derivatives 
of tχ with respect to the two policy variables ,t tτ η . To that end, we differentiate in (22) to 
obtain:  
( )
( ) ( )
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1
(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1
(1 )
11(1 ) (1 ) , 0
(1 )
t t t t t t t
t t
t t t t t t t t t
t t t
d
d
σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ
σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ
σχ φ γ χ φ σ θ σ γ χ
φ α τ
χ φ γ θ σ χ φ σ θ σ γ τ η τ
α τ ατ τ
− − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − −
 − − − − + 
 − −
− + − − Ω = − 
so that, 
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(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
11 (1 )(1 ) ,
(1 )
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t
t t t t t
t t t tt
t
t t t
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d
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σ θ σ σ θ σ
τ
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α τσ θ σχ φ γ θ σ τ η
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χ
τ
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χ γ
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 − −− −
− + Ω − = =
 
+ − − 
 
, (A4.2) 
and, similarly, we would obtain: 
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( )
( )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
,(1 ) 1(1 )
1 1
1 1(1 )
t
t tt
t t t
t t t tt
t
t t t
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d
d
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η
σ θ σ σ θ σ
τ ηα η σ θ σ αχ φ γ θ σ
αη η γ α ηχ
χ
η
χ φ γ σ σ θ σ
χ γ
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 
+ − − 
 
. (A4.3) 
As we can see, the product (1 ) (1 )t t t
σ θ σ σ θ σχ φ γ− − − − cancels out again in both partial derivatives. 
As a consequence, the characterization of that product that we made at (22) as a function 
,( / )p t tF k k of the state of the economy does not play any role in the first Generalized Euler 
equation that relates the optimal choice of the two policy variables ,t tτ η  . 
Using now the partial derivatives ,
t tτ η
χ χ in the first Generalized Euler equation (A4.1), we 
finally get: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
11 (1 )(1 ) 1 ,1 ,
1
(1 ) (1 )1 , 1 ,
1
tt
t t tt t t
t tt t
t t
t t t t
t t t t
α ηα τ σ θ σσ θ σ χ θ η τη τ χ θ
θγ α ηθγ τ
τ α α ησ σσ η τ σ η τ
θχ τ θχ α η
−  − − − −− −
+ + Ω+ Ω +    −−   =
− − −
− + Ω − + Ω
− −
 
that can only hold if: 
1 ,
1t t
tατ
η
−
= ∀
−
.  
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Appendix 5. The planner’s problem under lump-sum taxes 
A planner with access to lump-sum taxes would allocate resources so as to maximize 
time aggregate utility with the global constraint of resources as its sole restriction, thereby 
solving the problem, 
{ }1
1 (1 )
, , , 0
1
1t t pt t
t t t
c k k g t
c gMax
σ θ σ
ρ
σ+
− −∞
=
−
−∑  
subject to:  
1
1 , ,(1 )t t t t p t t p tk k c g k Bk k
α αδ −+ − − + + + = , 
leading to optimality conditions: 
1
1 (1 )
1/1 (1 ) (1 ) ,t
t
c B
c
α σ θ σ
ααρ α α δ
− − −
+
   = − + −  
   
 
that defines the rate of growth Pγ , and 
[ ]
1
1/ 1/1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )t t t
t
k B B
k
α
α α αδ χ θχ α α
−
+ − − + + + − = − . 
These relationships lead to expressions for the ratios of private and public consumption to 
private capital: 
1
1/1 (1 ) (1 ) ,
1P P
B
α
α αχ α α δ γ
θ
− 
= − + − − +  
 
.tP P
t
g
k
φ θχ= =  
For the purpose of comparison with the Markov and Ramsey equilibria, we can 
introduce a measure of the size of the public sector, as ,t p tPt
t
g k
y
τ
+
=  and the composition of 
public expenditures, 
,
P t
t
t p t
g
g k
η =
+
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Figure 1 
Values for the main variables in the economy under the three equilibrium concepts, 
for different values of the risk aversion parameter 
 
θ = 0.40        Relative weight of public consumption in utility function 
α = 0.80        Elasticity of private capital in production function 
ρ = 0.99        Discount rate 
δ  = 0.10       Depreciation rate 
B  = 0.4555   Productivity level  
From left to right and from above to below, the graphs display: the 
share of public resources devoted to public consumption, the optimal 
income tax rate, the growth rate along the balanced path, the 
difference between the growth rates under the Ramsey and the 
Markov policies, and the ratios of private and public consumption to 
output. 
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Figure 2 
Values for the main variables in the economy under the three equilibrium concepts, 
for different values of the relative weight of public consumption in the utility function 
σ = 2.0          Relative risk aversion 
α = 0.80        Elasticity of private capital in production function 
ρ = 0.99        Discount rate 
δ  = 0.10        Depreciation rate 
B  = 0.4555    Productivity level  
From left to right and from above to below, the graphs display: the 
share of public resources devoted to public consumption, the optimal 
income tax rate, the growth rate along the balanced path, the 
difference between the growth rates under the Ramsey and the 
Markov policies, and the ratios of private and public consumption to 
output. 
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Figure 3 
Consumption compensation needed for the Markov policy to achieve the same level of 
welfare as the planner’s allocation of resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
σ = 2.00        Relative risk aversion (in the second graph) 
θ = 0.40        Relative weight of public consumption in preferences (in the first graph) 
α = 0.80        Elasticity of private capital in production function 
ρ = 0.99        Discount rate 
δ  = 0.10        Depreciation rate 
B  = 0.4555    Productivity level  
